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INTRODUCTION
By putting an end to a thirty-five year campaign to nullify Miranda
v. Arizona,' did the federal judiciary engage in inappropriate judicial
activism or appropriate judicial restraint?
At first blush, the answer to this question seems simple, namely:
the Miranda override litigation is an obvious, blatant example ofjudi-
cial overreaching. In deciding whether Congress could statutorily nul-
lify Miranda, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court both reached out to decide an issue that simply was not a part
of the case. Neither party to the case, Dickerson v. United States,2 called
attention to a 1968 statutes providing that police need not issue
Miranda warnings. Instead, both sides agreed that Miranda was the
appropriate benchmark in weighing the admissibility of a confession.'
Consequently, by first looking to the 1968 statute, not Miranda, to sort
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120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994)
(held unconstitutional by Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000)).
4 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
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out the admissibility of a confession, the Fourth Circuit committed
plain error. After all, a central tenet of our adversarial system is that
(save for jurisdictional issues) the parties to a case-not the judges
6deciding the case-raise the legal arguments. For its part, the Su-
preme Court, by granting certiorari to decide the constitutionality of
the 1968 statute, played fast and loose with the Constitution's "case or
controversy" requirement 7 With neither party willing to defend the
statute,8 the Justices-to preserve the semblance of an adversarial dis-
pute-appointed counsel to argue the "government's side" of the
9case.
This characterization of Dickerson is widely shared. In particular,
depicting the Fourth Circuit as "'an assistant teeing up issues for the
Supreme Court and scouting new enemies to conquer '""0 and "the
flagship of the federal judiciary's increasingly aggressive conservative
wing,"" academics and journalists alike have savaged the appellate
court for sua sponte considering the 1968 statute. Complaining that
6 At an early stage in the litigation, the Justice Department argued that the Dicker-
son confession was admissible under the 1968 statute. Pretrial Rehearing Brief for the
United States at 2 n.1, United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) (No.
97-4750) (copy on file with author). By the time Dickerson made its way to the appellate
court, however, the government elected to limit its arguments to Miranda, not the 1968
statute. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 680-81 (noting the government did not brief the ap-
plicability of§ 3501 on appeal).
U.S. CONST. art III, § 2.
Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 578 (1999) (mem).
Id. Technically, the Court appointed Paul Cassell "amicus curiae" to defend the
constitutionality of the 1968 statute. Id. ("Paul G. Cassell, Esquire, of Salt Lake City,
Utah, is invited to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the judg-
ment below."). Cassell, a University of Utah law professor and Washington Legal
Foundation lawyer, has dedicated himself to the undoing of Miranda through the writ-
ing of articles and the filing of briefs. See Terry Carter, The Man Who Would Undo
Miranda, A.BA. J., Mar. 2000, at 44 (profiling Cassell). Before the Fourth Circuit,
moreover, Cassell sought and was granted permission to defend the statute through
the filing of an arnicus brief and the presentation of oral arguments. See Dickerson, 166
F.3d at 680-81 n.14 (explaining why it granted the Washington Legal Foundation's mo-
tion to participate in the Dickerson litigation).
,0 Brooke A. Masters, 4th Circuit Pushing to Right WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 1999, at C-1
(quoting Akhil K. Amar, Yale University law professor).
Garrett Epps, Playing Supreme Court with Privay: 4th Circuit Went Too Far in Reno
v. Condon, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 8, 1999, at 58; see also Vivian Berger, Don't Mourn
Miranda Yet, NAT'L. LJ., Sept. 20, 1999, at A-22 (noting the Fourth Circuit is "the court
of appeals most viscerally hostile to defendants' rights"); Carrie Johnson, Testing the
Limits: 4th Circuit's Conservative Push to High Court, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 4, 1999, at 1;
Brooke A. Masters, 4th Circuit Is Steering Hard to the Right, WASH. POST, July 5, 2000, at
B-i (stating that the Dickerson decision was the 4th Circuit's biggest loss of the Supreme
Court's term).
12 See, e.g., StephenJ. Schulfofer, 'Miranda' Now on the Endangered Species Lis NAT'L
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the Fourth Circuit was animated by a desire to undo Miranda, critics
deemed the decision "a heavy dose of conservative judicial activism"n
and "the most surprising and ill-considered instance of judicial activ-
ism' in recent memory." 14 In reversing the Fourth Circuit, the Su-
preme Court too has been criticized for using Dickerson as a vehicle to
advance its ideological preferences. By declaring that Congress can-
not overturn Court-created constitutional norms'" the Court's reaf-
firmation of Miranda has been portrayed as part and parcel of a
Rehnquist Court campaign to limit congressional power. For exam-
ple, commenting that "[t] here might well have been a period, some-
time in the last three decades, when the Court would have overturned
Miranda," The New York Timess Linda Greenhouse argues that "timing"
explained the Court's decision: the fact that "the [C]ourt's interest in
protecting its constitutional turf against congressional incursions was
at a peak unmatched in recent years." 6
In the pages that follow, I will take issue with this prevailing wis-
dom. Pointing to the judiciary's Article III duty to decide cases ac-
cording to the law, I will argue that the Fourth Circuit was correct in
paying attention to Congress's mandate that the 1968 statute, not
Miranda, set out the "law" governing the admissibility of confessions.7
L.J., Mar. 1, 1999, at A-22 (describing the Fourth Circuit's decision as "an extraordi-
nary act ofjudicial buccaneering"); Stuart Taylor,Jr., RaisingMiranda: Will the Supreme
Court Remain Silent?, LEGAL TIMEs, Oct. 25, 1999, at 67 (describing how the Fourth Cir-
cuit overruled Miranda even though the Department of justice had not questioned its
applicability).
11 Taylor, supra note 12, at 67.
14 Schulhofer, supra note 12, at A22.
15 Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2329.
i, Linda Greenhouse, A Turf Battle's Unlikely Victim, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2000, at
A20; see also Tony Mauro, Split Branches: Little Deference to Congress as Court Curbs Federal
Power, LEGAL TIMES, May 22, 2000, at 1 (quoting a speech by Justice Scalia, suggesting
that the Supreme Court should no longer presume acts of Congress to be constitu-
tional because Congress takes the attitude that "'it will do anything it can get away with
and let the Supreme Court worry about the Constitution"'). For other news analyses
calling attention to the ongoing battle between the Court and Congress, see Linda
Greenhouse, Supreme Court. The Justices Decide Who's in Charge, N.Y. TIMEs, June 27,
1999, at 4-1 (noting the Court's lack of deference to Congress's federal legislation
views); Suzanna Sherry, Some Targets Were Larger than Others, WASH. POsT, July 4, 1999,
at B4 (indicating the Court's term was highlighted by invalidating federal legislation
that violated state's rights). Ironically, had the Supreme Court ruled the other way in
Dickerson, it-like the Fourth Circuit-would have been criticized for its opportunistic,
ideological repudiation of Miranda.
17 This is not to say that the Fourth Circuit was correct in concluding that the 1968
statute was constitutional. My point is simply that, if constitutional, the 1968 statute
trumped Miranda. See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text (explaining that judi-
cial powers are limited and that the courts must enforce applicable laws).
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Otherwise, litigants could effectively direct courts to decide cases ac-
cording to their policy preferences, not the law. At the same time, the
Clinton administration was not obligated to defend the constitutional-
ity of the 1968 statute. The executive's Article II power to interpret
the Constitution certainly extends to the Clinton Justice Department's
decision to argue that the 1968 statute was unconstitutional but that
Dickerson's confession was admissible under Miranda. Faced with a
real dispute over the confession's admissibility but unable to direct the
government to defend the 1968 statute, the Supreme Court was right
in appointing counsel to defend the 1968 statute.
None of this is to say that ideology did not animate either the
Fourth Circuit or the Supreme Court.L' 8 It is to say, however, that core
separation of powers principles support the decisions both to consider
the 1968 statute and to appoint outside counsel to defend the statute's
constitutionality. In other words, while the line separating judicial ac-
tivism from judicial restraint may be murky, the responsibility for each
branch of government to independently interpret the law is clear.
I. PRELIMINARIES
In our tripartite system of government, a system of checks and
balances, each branch is empowered to independently interpret the
Constitution and, in so doing, to serve as a bulwark against the ag-
grandizement of too much power in any other branch. Furthermore,
each branch possesses core powers-powers that cannot be delegated
to another branch. Consider the relationship of the judiciary to the
executive. On the one hand, since the "judicial power of the United
States" is vested in federal courts,19 Congress could not transfer this
power to executive agencies. "That would be to sap the judicial power
as it exists under the Federal Constitution, and to establish a govern-
ment of a bureaucratic character alien to our system .... ,,0 At the
18 See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text (calling attention to claims that
both the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court were politically motivated); see also Er-
win Chemerinsky, The Court Should Have Remained Silent: Why the Court Erred in Deciding
United States v. Dickerson, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 291 (suggesting that the Fourth
Circuit was animated by ideology); infra note 102 (same). For a treatment of the role
of ideology in judicial decisionmaking, see generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE
CHOICES JusTIcEs MAKE (1998) (providing an overview of ideological decisionmak-
ing).
I9 U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.
20 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57 (1932). Since Crowell was decided, of course,
administrative agencies have assumed more and more judicial functions. Nevertheless,
their orders are subject to review by an Article III court.
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same time, the judiciary must respect the executive's power to enforce
the law. For example, the executive possesses prosecutorial discre-
tion: the power to launch prosecutions, introduce evidence, and the
like. As such, it would be impermissible for a federal court to assume
the role of prosecutor by, say, introducing into evidence a confession
that the executive deemed inadmissible.
What then of the Dickerson litigation? Here, the executive intro-
duced into evidence a confession that it deemed admissible under
Miranda, the standard it employs in assessing confessions. And while
the criminal defendant, Charles Dickerson, thought the confession
should be suppressed, Dickerson agreed with the government that
Miranda was the governing rule of law.2 By applying a different rule
of law than the one subscribed to by both the government and Dicker-
son, the appeals court put its desire to "say what the law is" ahead of
the executive's desire to define criminal prosecutions.
How can I say that this decision is grounded in the separation of
powers, not a usurpation of prosecutorial discretion-a core executive
power?2 More fundamentally, in the absence of a concrete dispute
over the appropriate legal standard, how can I say that the separation
of powers requires federal courts to sua sponte raise the 1968 statute?
Let me begin with a confession. When I began thinking about
this project, my first impulse was to write a paper condemning conser-
vatives for engaging in the same type of activism that conservatives
have long accused liberal judges of, that is, reaching out to decide
cases to make law, not resolve concrete adversarial disputes. Specifi-
cally, in campaigning against "judicial activism," Ronald Reagan and
other conservatives bemoaned "a weakening of the court's resolve to
21 "On January 27, 1997, Charles T. Dickerson confessed to robbing a series of
banks in Maryland and Virginia." United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 671 (4th
Cir. 1999). According to the government, Dickerson was read (and waived) his
Miranda rights. Id. at 675-76.
=1 According to Dickerson, the confession took place before the reading of his
Miranda rights. Id. at 674-76. The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia sided with Dickerson and, consequently, suppressed the confession. See
United States v. Dickerson, 971 F. Supp. 1023, 1023-25 (E.D. Va. 1997) (upholding its
previous decision to suppress certain evidence that was gathered in violation of Dicker-
son's constitutional rights), rev'd, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2326
(2000).
k' In Dickerson, an amicus brief filed by former Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti
argues that, by raising the 1968 law sua sponte, the Fourth Circuit undermined core
executive powers. Brief of Benjamin R Civiletti, Amicus Curiae, Dickerson v. United
States, 120 S. Ct. 578 (1999) (No. 99-5525). For reasons detailed below, I think this
position is incorrect. See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
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abide by the case or controversy requirement.' '24 Indeed, Reagan's
first Attorney General, William French Smith, "pledged on taking of-
fice ... that cases should not be adjudicated where the party bringing
the case had only a remote connection with the issues; where the un-
derlying dispute was not 'ripe' . . . and where the matter was properly
resolved by the political branches, Congress or the executive." 5' Ac-
cordingly, for Smith and other conservatives, the separation of powers
demands that courts should only review those issues that are truly in
21controversy and therefore represented by vigorous advocacy.
On the surface, the Miranda override litigation appears to be pre-
cisely the type of case that Smith had in mind. With no adversarial
dispute on the governing substantive legal rule, the question of
whether prosecutors should utilize the 1968 statute seemed a political
matter best resolved by Congress and the executive, not the courts.
To determine whether Congress had overruled Miranda, a court (or
so I thought) would have to eschew this "dispute resolution" model in
favor of the so-called "public values" model of adjudication. 7 Under
the public values model, "the function of the judge ... is not to resolve
disputes, but to give the proper meaning to our public values."28 Con-
24 W ILLIAM FRENCH SMITH, LAw AND JusTIcE IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 59
(1991).
SMITH, supra note 24, at 60. Under this view, when the basis for decision falls
outside the framework of the litigants' arguments, "the adjudicative process has be-
come a sham, for the parties' participation in the decision has lost all meaning." Lon
L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 388 (1978). Relat-
edly, "[a]n adversary presentation seems the only effective means for combating the
natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not
yet fully known." Id. at 383.
For these conservatives, "the premise of our adversarial system" has always been
that federal courts "do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but
essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before
them." Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 408 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (quotation marks omitted).
See generally Evan Tsen Lee, DeconstitutionalizingJusticiability: The Example of Moot-
ness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603, 625-28 (1992) (presenting these two models of adjudica-
tion).
28 Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term: Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 30 (1979). For proponents of this model, "the fundamental concep-
-tion of litigation as a mechanism for private dispute settlement is no longer viable.
The argument is about whether or how a government policy or program shall be car-
ried out." Abram Chayes, The Role of theJudge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1294-95 (1976). Correspondingly, "justice comes not from individual participa-
tion, but from the process of giving meaning to constitutional values." Susan Bandes,
The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 287 (1990); see also Neal Kumar Katyal,Judges as
Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1822 (1998) (defending judicial advicegiving as a
way to "aid our governments in the task of serving their master-the American peo-
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sequently, concrete adverseness, while perhaps necessary to com-
mence litigation, "becomes unimportant, whatever the stage of litiga-
tion, since the primary goal is to resolve the issue, not to settle a dis-
pute between parties." In Dickerson, the fact that the government and
Dickerson disagreed over the admissibility of the confession was more
than sufficient adversiveness to support judicial resolution of any and
all related questions.
At first blush, the Dickerson litigation seemed like a textbook ex-
ample of the profound difference between the "public values" and
"dispute resolution" models. For this very reason, a project calling at-
tention to the willingness of conservatives, both judges and interest
groups like the Washington Legal Foundation, to compromise their
views on the judicial role in order to advance their policy preferences
seemed worth doing. It would highlight the difficulty of placing
something as abstract as a vision of the separation of powers ahead of
something as concrete as desired policy outcomes."
The longer I researched and thought about this issue, however,
the more I came to doubt my original impulse. More to the point, as I
will now argue, the sua sponte raising of the 1968 statute and the ap-
pointment of amicus curiae to defend the statute's constitutionality is
consistent with the "dispute resolution" model of litigation. At its
core, the "dispute resolution" model calls upon courts to see Article
III as a limited grant of jurisdictional authority.3' Consequently, in
order to respect the primacy of elected government decisionmaking,
federal courts must vigilantly police the boundaries of their Article III
powers. Accordingly, starting with Marbuy v. Madison, the federal
pie").
:;9 Bandes, supra note 28, at 290. For an argument that the Framers understood
the main purpose of the judiciary in Article III "cases" to be the expounding of federal
law, see RobertJ. PushawJr., Article lI's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Func-
tions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 447 (1994). For a sampling of articles
highlighting the Supreme Court's sometimes-willingness to embrace the public values
model, see Bandes, supra note 28, at 283 n.386; Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Stand-
ing. 72 CAL. L. REV. 68 (1984); Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DUKE L.J. 187
(1997).
Nelson Lund made a similar point in Lauyers and the Defense of the Presidency, 1995
BY.U. L. REv. 17, an article which showcased the willingness of the Bush administra-
tion to sacrifice its conception of Article II power in order to advance short-term policy
priorities. See also John 0. McGinnis, Impeachable Defenses, 95 PoL'Y REv. 27 (1999)
(calling attention to the willingness of left-leaning academics to embrace originalism-
an interpretive theory they disavow in their writings-in arguing that President Clinton
should not be impeached).
I31 Questions ofjurisdiction "should be given priority-since if there is no jurisdic-
tion there is no autiority to sit in judgment of anything else." Vt. Agency of Natural
Res. v. United States ex reL Stevens, 120 S. Ct. 1858, 1865 (2000).
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courts have sua sponte raised jurisdictional issues.3 2 For example, if a
litigant lacks standing to sue, it is the judiciary's responsibility to dis-
miss the case-that opposing counsel may not have called attention to
the standing issue is irrelevant.
In the typical case, the "dispute resolution" model would see the
absence of adversariness as proof positive that the court is without ju-
risdiction. Dickerson, however, is far from typical. The Department of
Justice and the criminal defendant disagreed about whether there was
proof to support a criminal conviction. Far more significant (for my
purposes), the two sides disagreed over the admissibility of Dicker-
son's confession. 3 In short, it is clear that the courts had jurisdiction
over Dickerson, including jurisdiction over the admissibility of the con-
fession. The question then becomes whether, in resolving this dis-
pute, the court's power necessarily includes the power to take into ac-
count the 1968 statute. In part, this is a question of jurisdiction,
namely: before determining whether Dickerson's confession is admis-
sible under Miranda, is the question of the 1968 statute's applicability
a jurisdictional prerequisite?M Alternatively, in exercising its Article
III power to decide the confession's admissibility, may a federal court
consider legal arguments that it deems relevant but are not raised by
either party?
II. ARTICLE III AND THE DUTY TO "SAY WHAT THE LAW IS"
The very idea of an independent judiciary is grounded in the be-
lief that it is for the courts to "say what the law is." 3' During the 1780s,
the founders thought it "necessary to guarantee the judges' inde-
pendence and integrity" in response to a growing mistrust of elected
32 In the Marbuy litigation, the litigants did not question the jurisdictional author-
ity of the Supreme Court. Madison did not appear before the Court, choosing instead
to ignore the lawsuit. Marbury's counsel, Charles Lee, not surprisingly did not call into
question the Supreme Court's power to issue a writ of mandamus. See Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 146-53 (1803) (suggesting the parties failed to raise
jurisdictional issues the Court raised on its own).
33 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (noting the parties' disagreement
over whether Dickerson confessed before he was read his Miranda rights).
34 See infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text (discussing the tension between
§ 3501 and Miranda).
35 Sometimes, of course, it is for the political branches to say what the law is. On
political questions, like impeachment, the power to "say what the law is" resides in the
political branches. Furthermore (and far more significantly), the political branches
regularly interpret the Constitution. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the power of presidential review).
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government, especially the legislatures." In The Federalist No. 78, Ham-
ilton likewise spoke of the need for the judiciary to remain "truly dis-
tinct from both the legislative and the executive" and, in so doing, for
the courts to keep elected officials "within the limits assigned to their
authority."37 Accordingly, the "interpretation of the laws is the proper
and peculiar province of the courts." 8
This belief in an independent judiciary is very much tied to the
notion that the "rule of law" should triumph over the "rule of men."39
By insisting that the political branches "act through general, public
rules," the founders embraced "a higher or constitutional law that
governs ordinary lawmaking, as well as politically independent courts
of law to enforce this higher law against public officials."40 In this way,
the founders saw independent courts testing the legality of govern-
ment decisionmaking as the best hope of maintaining the rule of law
and, with it, protecting citizens against tyranny.
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's 1995 decision in
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm InC.41 Concluding that Congress cannot re-
quire federal courts to reopen final judgments, the Court invalidated
amendments to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 allowing for
the reopening of lawsuits that had been dismissed on technical
grounds, namely, the failure to file within the (then pertinent) statu-
tory timelines.4 Pointing to the Framers' "sense of a sharp necessity to
separate the legislative from the judicial power, 43 the Court approv-
ingly cited language from The Federalist No. 81 that "[a] legislature
without exceeding its province cannot reverse a determination once
made, in a particular case; though it may prescribe a new rule for fu-
4" GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, at
456 (1969).
17 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 523-25 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
Id. at 525.
'See Ernest Weinrib, The Intelligibiliy of the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW:
IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 59, 62-63 (Alan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987)
(distinguishing Plato's belief in the "rule of men" from Aristotle's belief in the "rule of
law").
+J Stephen Macedo, The Rule of Law, Justice, and the Politics of Moderation, in THE
RULE OF LAW 148, 149 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994). This is not to say, however, that courts
ought to issue advisory opinions, comment on nongermane legal issues through dicta,
and the like. It is to say, instead, that-when courts have jurisdiction to decide-the
law, not the arguments of litigants, should control.
41 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
42 See id. at 240 (holding the amendment unconstitutional "to the extent that it re-
quires federal courts to reopen final judgments entered before its enactment").
4-1 Id. at 221.
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ture cases.,44 By separating the judicial power "not merely to rule on
cases, but to decide them" from the legislative power to prescribe rules,
Plaut makes clear that popular government cannot interfere with the
court's power to interpret the laws.45
Plaut, of course, is little more than a modem day application of
Marbury v. Madison.46 Marbury, by declaring that "[i]t is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to [s]ay what the law
is," speaks to the Court's power and obligation to decide cases in ac-
cordance with the governing law.47 And while Marbury is especially
concerned with the constitutionality of elected government decision-
making, the question of whether or not government conforms to its
legal obligations is certainly at the heart of the decision. s Corre-
spondingly, in holding that courts can order government officials to
comply with the law,49 Marbuy makes clear that no one is above the
law and, accordingly, that courts will not facilitate disobedience to the
law.
50
Like The Federalist No. 78, Marbury equates judicial independence
with the power to "say what the law is." As such, it is well established
that parties to a dispute cannot agree to bind the court on stipulated
questions of law. Otherwise, the rule of men would triumph over the
rule of law. For this reason, "[w]hen an issue or claim is properly be-
fore the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories
advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to
44 Id. at 222 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 545 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob
E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
1 Id. at 218-19.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
47 Id. at 177; see also James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power":
The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article II Courts, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 696, 711-15 (1998) (discussing the development of the federal courts at the Con-
stitutional Convention).
48 See DAvID P. CURRIE, FEDERALJURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL 5 (3d ed. 1990) (dis-
cussing two theories ofjudicial review in Marbury); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional
Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1370-71 (1973) (discussing the role
of the courts in a system of limited government); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the
Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 11 (1983) (arguing that "an article 111 court
cannot be 'jurisdictionally' shut off from full consideration of the substantive constitu-
tional issues").
49 See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180 (concluding that courts are bound by the
Constitution).
See Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings ofJudicial
Review: In Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 SUP. CT. REv. 329, 378-79 (discussing why
Marbuy stood for the concept that no person is above the law).
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identify and apply the proper construction of governing law."5' Fur-
thermore, since "[t] he public interest that a result be reached which
promotes a well-ordered society is foremost in every criminal proceed-
ing... the proper administration of the criminal law cannot be left
merely to the stipulation of parties."
52
The duty of courts to look to the law, not just the arguments of
litigants, implies that courts can, among other things, undertake in-
dependent research to sort out the relevant law, consider the argu-
ments of amici, and address issues necessary to the resolution of the
case that neither party raises in briefs or oral arguments.3 For exam-
ple, in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,14 both parties to the case sought to
preserve Swift v. Tyson,'5 that is, the federal courts' then-existing prac-
tice of applying federal common law in diversity cases. Indeed, Erie's
counsel, Theodore Kiendel, saw his primary goal as "preserv[ing]
Swift," notwithstanding the fact that Erie would have won under state
A Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991); see also Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989) (plurality opinion) (acknowledging the Court's will-
ingness to consider an argument raised only in an amicus brief); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 646 n.3 (1961) (same), overruled in part on other grounds by Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976); Estate of Stanford v. Comm'r, 308 U.S. 39, 51 (1939) ("We are not
bound to accept, as controlling, stipulations as to questions of law."); Swift & Co. v.
Hocking Calley Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 281, 289 (1917) ("The duty of this court, as of every
judicial tribunal, is limited to determining rights of persons or of property, which are
actually controverted in the particular case before it. ... No stipulation of parties or
counsel ... can enlarge the power, or affect the duty, of the court in this regard."
(quotation marks omitted)). In citing these cases, I do not mean to suggest that courts
possess a roving commission to decide any and all questions of law that they deem
relevant to the underlying dispute. See infra notes 130-33.
r, Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 259 (1942). It is noteworthy that
"[b]ecause personal liberty is most at stake, in the criminal law, the normative force of
the rule of law is especially strong and undergirds the maxim 'No crime, no punish-
ment without law.'" Kenneth Henley, Rule of Law, in 2 PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA 765, 766 (Christopher B. Gray ed., 1999).
It also suggests that, when fashioning equitable relief, federal courts may take
account of the "public interest." United States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall
P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994). For example, in the context of deciding a motion to
vacate ajudgment (after the parties entered into a settlement agreement, mooting the
merits of the case), the Supreme Court has ruled that: "'Judicial precedents are pre-
sumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not
merely the property of private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that
the public interest would be served by a vacatur.'" Id. (quoting Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo
Kabushiki Kaisha v. United States Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27,40 (1993) (StevensJ, dis-
senting)).
,4 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (considering which state's law to apply in a federal diversity
case).
56 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842) (holding that the Rules of Decision Act referred to
statutes and local usages, not state common law), overruled by Erie R.R, 304 U.S. at 78.
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law.s6 Arguing that "[t] he persistent criticisms of Swift... have largely
been misdirected," Kiendel sought to use Swift to his advantage."
Consequently, with Tompkins' attorneys firmly committed to Swift, the
Justices understood that neither party would call for the overruling of
Swift-even if the Court specifically requested briefing on the issue.
Whether or not Erie's sua sponte overturning of Suft is a byproduct of
this litigation strategy, Erie stands for the proposition that the Court
will place adherence to the law ahead of the legal arguments made in
court.
Erie is important for another reason. In holding that the parties to
a controversy do not control "the choice of law," the Court made clear
that it-not the parties-would decide whether a legal argument is or
is not waivable. In some (even most) instances, the law contemplates
that the parties to a dispute can waive pertinent legal claims." Other
times, however, the law does not allow for waiver. On those occasions,
it is the court's responsibility to honor the law, not party preferences."
Another example of this phenomenon is the "gatekeeping role"
the courts have assumed in administering the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.6 In sorting out whether to admit expert scientific testimony,
for example, a judge "should... be mindful" of all "applicable rules"
of evidence." More to the point, whenever the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence mandate a particular course of action, it is the court's duty to
adhere to the law and take that mandate into account.6' That is the
lesson of Marbury.
What then of Dickerson? On the one hand, where jurisdiction is
clear and the legal issue squarely before the court, Marbury is une-
quivocal in its demand that the court must make its decision under
56 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 100
(2000).
57 Id. at 100 (quotation marks omitted).
58 Consider, for example, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Under the Act,
"[a] person" whose statutory rights have been violated "may assert that violation as a
claim or defense in ajudicial proceeding." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (c) (1994) (emphasis
supplied). Here, Congress clearly left it to the affected party to claim or waive her
statutory rights, a fact that (before the Supreme Court struck the Act down) several
lower courts picked up on in refusing to sua sponte raise the statute.
59 On questions of facts, parties may stipulate to erroneous facts, including the
facts of where a transaction took place (something which would affect the choice of
law). Parties, however, may not stipulate to the wrong law.
Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
61 Id. at 595.
62 And if the mandate is unconstitutional, it is the court's responsibility to invali-
date the mandate and thereby adhere to the supreme law.
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the governing law." At the same time, the law includes Article III and,
as Marbuy makes clear, Article III places real limits on the judicial
power. For example, questions irrelevant to the parties in a dispute
are presumptively outside the scope of judicial authority. Further-
more, matters committed to the discretion of another branch are out-
side the purview of judicial review.6 In the end, Marbuiy calls upon
courts to honor the Framers' admonition that the judicial power
(which includes the power to "say what the law is") is "limited to cases
of a Judiciary nature."65
In applying these principles to Dickerson, the language of the 1968
statute is critically important. If the law grants the executive discre-
tion to choose between Miranda and the 1968 standard, the executive
is free to waive its rights under the 1968 statute. But if the law man-
dates that federal courts-in assessing the admissibility of confes-
sions-adhere to the 1968 standard, courts are duty bound to take
that statutory standard into account. Otherwise, rather than "say what
the law is," the court would effectively leave it to the parties to stipu-
late the governing legal standard.r Aside from violating their Article
III responsibilities, such an approach would undermine Congress's
Article I power to respond to Supreme Court decisions through the
enactment of positive law. And while prosecutorial discretion is a core
component of the executive's Article II powers, this discretion is in no
way undermined by an independent judiciary grounding its decisions
in the law. '  The prosecutor remains free to choose whom it will
f. When there are alternative grounds upon which a court can rule, courts should
generally avoid ruling on the constitutionality of an act of Congress. See Ashwander v.
Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The Court
will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the rec-
ord, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed
of."). Ashwander, however, does not permit a court to knowingly apply the wrong legal
standard in ruling on a case. Ashwander, moreover, does not allow a court to sub silen-
tio assume that an act of Congress is unconstitutional so that it can avoid ruling on the
constitutionality of a statute.
,4 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (noting the limits of
the Court's jurisdiction).
2 FARRAND, THE REcoRDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (1911).
For further discussion, see infra Part III (noting that under Article I, the separa-
tion of powers also protects executive branch prerogative).
0 The judiciary is only supposed to apply the law, not make law in competition
with the legislature. Needless to say, Congress could empower prosecutors with the
discretion to employ either the statutory standard or Miranda. See infra Part III (dis-
cussing Congress's place within the tripartite system). But the decision is Congress's,
not the parties. Prosecutorial discretion is about the choice of whom to prosecute and
what evidence to introduce, not the legal theories that the courts will employ. Other-
wise, the executive would stand above both Congress and the courts. In particular,
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prosecute and to choose what evidence it will introduce at trial. 68
The 1968 statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3501, is a command to the courts,
not to the executive branch. In other words, while the executive re-
tains discretion over the launching of prosecutions and the introduc-
tion of evidence at trial, the executive has no control over the admini-
stration of § 3501. Furthermore, § 3501 does not grant judges the
discretion to heed or disregard Miranda. The statute, instead, speci-
fies that "[ijn any criminal prosecution brought by the United
States... a confession... shall be admissible in evidence if it is volun-
tarily given" and "[t] he trial judge in determining the issue of volun-
tariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surround-
ing the giving of the confession."6 9  By making use of mandatory
language, Congress deemed the prosecution's decision to employ or
courts could not demand that the executive adhere to judicial precedent. See infra
note 126 (questioning whether courts can ignore executive policies that the parties do
not raise). Likewise, Congress could not restrain the executive through the enactment
of positive law by, for example, mandating that certain legal arguments not be waived.
This strikes me as a profound violation of both Congress's Article I lawmaking power
and the court's power to "say what the law is." See infra note 80 (noting the ramifica-
tions of allowing the executive to dictate the legal arguments that a court will con-
sider). For this reason, I think that Erwin Chemerinsky has it backwards when he
claims that it is for the Justice Department, not the courts, to determine whether or
not to employ the 1968 statute. See Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 297 ("It thus vio-
lates separation of powers for a court to invoke § 3501 and consider a confession in
circumstances in which the Justice Department chose not to use it.").
Of course, the President, as I argue in the next section, is free to interpret the
Constitution and reach the conclusion that § 3501 is unconstitutional. See infra Part III
(discussing the President's powers under Article II). Accordingly, notwithstanding
what either the courts or Congress says, the President is free to treat Miranda as "law"
vis-A-vis executive branch decisionmaking. See infra Part III (noting that the Clinton
administration's decision to view Miranda as the governing legal standard was constitu-
tionally protected under Article II). What the President cannot do, however, is run
roughshod over the constitutional prerogatives of both the Congress and the courts.
For this very reason, I reject the claim that, in Dickerson, the courts should not have
ruled on § 3501 but, instead, should have served as advicegivers-telling the political
branches what the law is without issuing a binding precedent (so that the question of
whether § 3501 has legal force, ultimately, is a political matter to be worked out be-
tween Congress and the President). See generally Katyal, supra note 28, at 1711 (discuss-
ing the Court's role as an advicegiver).
68 Courts, under Marbuy, cannot interfere with matters committed to the discre-
tion of another branch. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170. At the same time, by introducing
the confession into evidence, the executive empowers the court to apply the law gov-
eruing the admissibility of confessions. For this reason, arguments made in Dickerson
that the executive had waived the 1968 statute are incorrect.
69 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000) (emphasis added).
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waive the statute legally irrelevant. Consequently, to look to Miranda
in assessing the admissibility of a confession, a court would have to ig-
nore a direct command from Congress to make use of the "totality of
circumstances" test. In so doing, rather than abide by its Article III
duty to "say what the law is," a court (aware of § 3501) would have
knowingly applied the wrong legal standard .
More is at stake here than the Article III duty to decide cases con-
sistent with the law. Honoring executive branch preferences, by using
the Miranda standard, would make the judiciary an adjunct in the per-
formance of a purely executive function: the implementation of the
law consistent with executive branch priorities.7' Specifically, if
§ 3501, not Miranda, is law, the question of whether Miranda is satis-
fied is only relevant to those prosecutors who see Miranda as the ap-
propriate policy benchmark for the introduction of confessions. Con-
sequently, assuming that § 3501 was constitutional, a decision on
whether Dickerson's confession satisfied Miranda would have been a
decision about the implementation of Department of Justice policy
preferences, not a decision grounded in the law.
True, were a court to rule on Miranda, not § 3501, the binding na-
ture of such a decision would ensure that the court is much more than
Contrary to the plain language of the statute, Erwin Chemerinsky argues that
"Congress meant to leave the issue of § 3501 entirely in the hands of the executive
branch." Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 307. Relying on a brief filed by the House
Democratic Leadership, Chemerinsky argues that § 3501 was "favored by those 'much
more interested in election year symboli[sm]'" than in overruling Miranda. Id. (quot-
ing Brief of Amicus Curiae House Democratic Leadership at 5, Dickerson v. United
States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000)). Contrary to this view, the Justice Department's exami-
nation of both the language and the history of § 3501 "confirms that Congress in-
tended Section 3501 to overrule... Miranda." Brief for the United States at 18,
United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 99-5525); see also Brief of
Amici Curiae Senators Orrin G. Hatch et al. at 5, United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d
667 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 99-5525) (noting that § 3501 supercedes Miranda). Further-
more, even if election year politics was the driving force of § 3501, the fact remains
that the statutory text is an unambiguous command to federal courtjudges. See Brief
of Amicus Curiae of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of
Representatives at 22 n.25, United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999)
(No. 99-5525) (noting that the politics involved in the passage of an act are not
grounds for its elimination).
71 Alternatively, by asking the court to rule on some standard other than the law,
the executive branch is seeking to assume a corejudiciai function ("say[ing] what the
law is"). Whatever characterization one likes, troublesome separation of powers issues
are raised when one branch performs the functions of another. See Peter L. Strauss,
Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency,
72 CoR TLL L. REv. 488, 492-96 (1987) (suggesting that the separation of powers,
more than anything, is a check against one branch aggrandizing power at the expense
of another).
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an underling of the executive.12 In contrast, were the executive able
to override the court and introduce (under § 3501) confessions found
inadmissible under Miranda, the court would subordinate itself to the
executive. In so doing, there would be a clear violation of one of the
principal checks protecting judicial independence, namely the prohi-
bition against advisory opinions. 73 At the same time, judicial resolu-
tion of the Miranda issue-notwithstanding its binding character-
comes perilously close to an advisory ruling. By sidestepping the
governing law in favor of a ruling on an ancillary policy question, such
a decision would speak only of matters unnecessary to the disposition
of the case.74 And for the Supreme Court, the prohibition against advi-
72 For identical reasons, a Supreme Court decision upholding § 3501 would bind
the executive. Specifically, when introducing a confession into evidence, the Justice
Department could not circumvent "the law" governing the admissibility of confessions,
that is, § 3501. For this reason, I think Erwin Chemerinsky is wrong in arguing that, in
Dickerson, government attorneys could nullify § 3501 simply by choosing "to proceed
without the confession or... [by] dismiss[ing] the prosecution against Dickerson."
Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 305. Imagine, for example, that the government dis-
missed its prosecution. Rather than vitiate the Court's ruling, such a decision would
call attention to the power of Dickerson-a decision so potent that it affects the gov-
ernment's choice about whom it will prosecute. None of this is to say that the Presi-
dent could not direct U.S. Attorneys to look to Miranda, not Dickerson, in sorting out
whether a confession should be introduced into evidence. Furthermore, whenever a
federal prosecutor introduced a confession into evidence, the prosecutor could call on
the courts to apply Miranda. See infra Part III (discussing power of presidential review).
Nevertheless, assuming that the Supreme Court had upheld § 3501, courts would ad-
here to § 3501 and, in this way, bind the President.
73 While there is significant disagreement over what constitutes an advisory opin-
ion, there is no question that a decision subject to review and modification by the po-
litical branches is a constitutionally prohibited advisory opinion. See Lee, supra note
27, at 643-51. The classic Supreme Court statement on this issue is Hayburn's Case, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792), where the justices declined to issue nonbinding opinions on
the amount of benefits owed to veterans of the Revolutionary War.
74 Furthermore, if Miranda is a rule of constitutional law, then to decide the admis-
sibility question under Miranda (assuming § 3501 is constitutional) is in essence to
render an unnecessary constitutional ruling. In so doing, the court would violate the
prudential (but constitutionally informed) rule against rendering a constitutional de-
termination where a nonconstitutional ground for decision is available. See, e.g., Jean
v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 (1985) ("Prior to reaching any constitutional questions,
federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision."); Alma Motor
Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 329 U.S. 129, 136 (1946) (declaring that courts should
not consider the constitutionality of congressional action "unless such adjudication is
unavoidable"). And although the Fourth Circuit in Dickerson seems to transgress the
related prudential rule against premature adjudication of constitutional questions by
not only raising § 3501 but determining its constitutionality-thus introducing, rather
than avoiding, a constitutional question-this move was consistent with the also-related
prudential rule favoring a disposition on the narrowest constitutional ground when a
constitutional ground cannot be avoided. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S.
211, 217 (1995) (attempting to resolve the case by considering "the narrower ground
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sory opinions (sometimes) stands as a bulwark against rulings on such
questions of policy.
One recent example of this phenomenon, United States National
Bank of Oregon v. Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc.,7 raised
an issue quite similar to that presented in Dickerson. Specifically, in a
lawsuit concerning the meaning of a statutory provision, neither party
called into question the validity of the underlying statute. Although
recognizing that the Court's decision would be binding on the parties,
the Justices nonetheless held that a ruling grounded on something
other than law would "permit litigants, by agreeing on the legal issue
presented, to extract the opinion of a court on hypothetical acts of
Congress or dubious constitutional principles, an opinion that would
be difficult to characterize as anything but advisory."76 For this very
reason, the Court suggested that-to avoid rendering an advisory
opinion-it must first consider the continuing validity of the underly-
77ing statute. Under this logic, before looking to Miranda to rule on
for adjudication" of two possible constitutional challenges). Specifically, a Miranda-
based ruling would apply both to the states and the federal government, whereas a rul-
ing Frounded in § 3501 would apply only to federal prosecutions.
508 U.S. 439 (1993).
Id. at 447; see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998)
(holding that to resolve contested questions of law-even if binding on the parties-
when jurisdiction is in doubt "comes to the same thing as an advisory opinion, disap-
proved by this Court from the beginning"). On other occasions, however, the Court
has signaled that it would not sua sponte consider antecedent legal issues. For exam-
ple, in validating (under the Federal Arbitration Act) a private arbitration agreement
the Court refused to consider whether the Act even applied to employment contracts.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991). While acknowledg-
ing that several amici discussed the applicability of the Act to employment contracts in
their filings, the Court noted that the parties did not "raise the issue in the courts be-
low; it was not addressed there; and it was not among the questions presented in the
petition for certiorari." Id. at 25 n.2. What the Court did not mention is that there was
a near-unanimous consensus that the Act does apply to employment contracts. In
other words, the Justices seem disinclined to sua sponte raise an issue that they do not
consider relevant to the case's disposition. For further discussion, see supra note 51
(listing cases where amici, rather than the parties to the case, raised legal issues and
theories that proved determinative). See also infra notes 132-33 (suggesting that courts
have a duty to raise antecedent legal issues).
V At the same time, the Court did not conclusively hold that it had a duty to rule
on the validity of the underlying statute. In upholding a D.C. Circuit decision (which
concluded that there was such a duty), the Supreme Court ruled that the appellate
court "had discretion" to consider this issue. Therefore, the Justices saw no reason to
decide whether the appellate court was correct in saying that there was a duty to re-
solve this issue. See Indep. Ins. Agents, 508 U.S. at 447-48 (discussing the appellate
court's discretion to consider the issue). The very next year, in Davis v. United States,
the Justices refused to sua sponte raise § 3501 in a ruling on the right to counsel. 512
U.S. 452 (1994). While acknowledging that they have the authority to consider legal
arguments that neither party raises, the Justices observed that "we are reluctant to do
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the validity of a confession, a court-to avoid rendering an advisory
opinion-would first want to look to § 3501. If it found § 3501 consti-
tutional, Miranda would be a legal nullity and consequently should
not be the basis of decision. Alternatively, if § 3501 were unconstitu-
tional, Miranda would be the appropriate rule of decision.
Whether or not one accepts Independent Insurance Agents's charac-• • • 78
terization of what constitutes an advisory opinion, it is hard to square
the grounding of a decision on a legal nullity with the Article III
command to "say what the law is." Consider, for example, a ruling on
the admissibility of a confession under Miranda, not § 3501. The
precedential effect of such a decision would be quite suspect. After
all, the Department of Justice could eschew the Miranda standard in
favor of § 3501 or, alternatively, make use of Miranda in some cases
and § 3501 in other cases.
To preserve its place in government, the judiciary must respect
both the reaches and limits of Article III. Thus, by introducing Dick-
erson's confession into evidence, the executive opened a Pandora's
box that it could not close. Specifically, notwithstanding the parties'
failure to raise § 3501, the court had jurisdiction to take into account
the law governing the admissibility of confessions. That law (at least
until June 26, 2000) included § 3501. Consequently, whether or not
the question of § 3501's constitutionality can be cast as ajurisdictional
one, a court's Article III responsibility to "say what the law is" strongly
supports judicial resolution of the § 3501 issue. And while inherent
limits on a court's ability to discover statutes and regulations (let alone
legal arguments) suggest that courts are not under a duty to discover
all relevant law, the mandatory nature of § 3501 suggests that the sua
sponte raising of the statute was proper, not simply permissible.79
so when the issue is one of first impression involving the interpretation of a federal
statute on which the Department ofJustice expressly declines to take a position." Id. at
457 n.*. Taken together, these two rulings cast doubt on the Court's suggestion that-
to avoid rendering an advisory opinion-it must answer antecedent legal questions by,
among other things, determining what legal standard governs the dispute. See also Eric
D. Miller, Should Courts Consider 18 U.S.C. § 3501 Sua Sponte?, 65 U. CHi. L. REV. 1029,
1039 n.56 (1998) (contending that the Court in Davis may have thought that § 3501
"should be considered sua sponte at some point in the future").
78 I do not. Like Evan Lee, I would limit the ban on advisory opinions to judg-
ments subject to review by the political branches and to preenactment review, that is,
judgments on laws that have not taken effect. See Lee, supra note 27, at 643-44 (de-
scribing the various meanings of "advisory opinion"). Moreover, for reasons described
above, it is unclear whether the Court really subscribes to this standard. See supra note
77 (discussing the fact that the Court suggests it has authority to render advisory opi-
nons but generally declines not to do so).
79 See infra notes 132-33 (discussing "rule of law" constraints that limit the court's
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Correspondingly, a Miranda-based ruling would eschew the longstand-
ing presumption that acts of Congress are constitutional and, in so do-
ing, frustrate Congress's Article I prerogative to amend the rules of
decision in nonconstitutional cases."" Consequently, until the ques-
tion of § 3501's constitutionality was settled, the courts should have
looked for ways not to ground their rulings on Miranda-even if that
would have meant the dismissal of the lawsuit.
The Fourth Circuit was correct in sua sponte raising the § 3501 is-
sue in Dickerson. Otherwise (since it thought § 3501 constitutional), it
would have confronted a true no-win situation. Specifically, since the
district court suppressed the confession on the basis that it violated
Miranda,"' the Fourth Circuit thought it had a choice between (a) ap-
plying the correct legal standard and allowing the admission of a valid
confession or (b) applying the wrong legal standard and keeping the
confession out of evidence. In other words, aside from honoring its
Article III responsibility to rule on the law, there were strong prag-
matic reasons supporting the decision."2
power to sua sponte raise legal issues and explaining why those constraints do not ap-
ply to Dickerson). Furthermore, to honor both Article III and the rule of law, courts
should decide cases according to (their understanding of) the relevant law, including
statutes and theories of interpretations uncovered by law clerks, amici, etc. See supra
notes 35-57 an accompanying text (discussing the analysis courts should make in de-
termining "what the law is"); infra notes 121-33 and accompanying text (describing the
need for courts to inform themselves using outside sources in order to determine the
"law").
N, Congress, as the Supreme Court recognized in Dickerson, "retains the ultimate
authority to modify or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure
that are not required by the Constitution." 120 S. Ct. at 2332. Title Eighteen of the
United States Code § 3501 was premised on the belief that the Constitution did not
mandate the so-called Miranda warnings. See Paul G. Cassell, The Statute that Time For-
got: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175, 227-31
(1999) (arguing that "the Constitution simply does not require the Miranda rules,"
which are merely "recommended procedural safeguards"). Consequently, by allowing
the executive to dictate the legal arguments that a court will consider, Congress's Arti-
cle I lawmaking powers would also be subordinated to executive branch desires. While
Congress would remain free to use its other powers (appropriations, for example) to
pressure the executive into defending the constitutionality of the 1968 statute, Con-
gress could not-consistent with the executive's Article II powers-mandate that the
Justice Department defend the statute. See infra notes 89, 94-96 and accompanying text
(describing how the President does not have to concede to all congressional de-
mands). For this very reason, Congress must also look to the courts to protect its law-
making prerogatives by saying "what the law is."
See supra note 22.
b In contrast, a court that thought § 3501 unconstitutional, rather than strike the
statute down and declare Miranda the governing legal standard, might well prefer rul-
ing on Miranda. Likewise, a court that thought the confession admissible under
Miranda might prefer to rule on Miranda and thereby avoid ruling on the constitution-
ality of § 3501. By calling attention to circumstances where a court might prefer to
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III. ARTICLE II AND THE PRESIDENT'S POWER NOT TO
EXECUTE UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAWS
What then of the Article II prerogatives of the executive branch?
Just as Article III protects the courts from grounding their decisions
on the legal theories subscribed to by the parties to a case, the separa-
tion of powers also protects executive branch prerogatives. In particu-
lar, by independently interpreting the Constitution, presidents need
not adhere to "unconstitutional" acts of Congress or to Supreme
Court decisions. While there are some limits to the exercise of this
power of presidential review, there is no question about President
Clinton's authority to conclude both that § 3501 was unconstitutional
and that the Dickerson confession was admissible under Miranda.
Before turning to the ramifications of presidential review on the
Dickerson litigation, a few words on why Article II empowers a Presi-
dent to disavow judicial and legislative interpretations of the Constitu-
tion.83 First and foremost, by presupposing that a President will check
judicial and legislative excess, our tripartite system assumes that the
executive is independent from, not subordinate to, Congress and the
courts. To maintain that independence, a President must be able to
84decide for herself what the Constitution means. The constitutional
sidestep a ruling on § 3501's constitutionality, I do not mean to suggest that it is ever
appropriate for a federal court to knowingly apply the wrong legal standard. For a
general treatment of the circumstances under which courts should avoid ruling on the
constitutionality of federal legislation, see Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional
Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003 (1994).
83 The best known treatments of this subject are Presidential Authority to Decline
to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 199 (1994); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 905 (1990); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. LJ.
217 (1994). While the scholarly literature overwhelmingly supports the power of
presidential review, there are some important critics of this position. See, e.g., RAOUL
BERGER, ExEcUTIvE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYrH 306 (1974) (indicating that
presidents are bound to "faithfully execute" all laws, even laws they think unconstitu-
tional); EDWARD S. CORWrN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFIcE AND POWERS 1787-1948, at 79 (3d
ed. 1948) (same); Arthur S. Miller, The President and the Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40
VAND. L. REV. 389, 396 (1987) (same).
84 This is true even if the current or prior administration had earlier decided to
abide by ajudicial ruling or legislative finding. SeeJeremy A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins,
Averting Government by Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements
with the Federal Government, 40 STAN. L. REV. 203, 219-26 (1987) (defending the power
of one administration not to be bound by the policy preferences of another admini-
stration-even if those preferences are grounded in an understanding of the Constitu-
tion). For this reason, it is irrelevant whether past administrations (or even the
Clinton administration) signaled their belief that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 was constitutional.
See Cassell, supra note 80, at 197-225 (highlighting the fact that, prior to arguing in
Dickerson that § 3501 is unconstitutional, every administration, including the Clinton
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text, in significant respects, supports this understanding. By taking an
oath to "faithfully execute the Office of the President... [and to]
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution,"'5 a President cannot
knowingly act in violation of the Constitution as supreme law." For
this reason, as recognized both in the Federalist Papers and in the de-
bates over the Constitution's ratification, presidential review extends
beyond the power to veto legislation on constitutional grounds and to
a President's "refus[al] to carry into effect an act that, [in his opin-
ion,] violates the Constitution.""'
The power of presidential review, moreover, is amply supported
by historical practice. Starting with Thomas Jefferson's decision to
pardon "every person under punishment or prosecution under" the
Alien and Sedition Acts (which criminalized speech critical of the
government), presidents-by independently interpreting the Consti-
tution-have departed from the constitutional judgments of Congress
and the courts."' The courts also acknowledge presidential review. By
appointing counsel to defend legislation that a President is unwilling
to defend (rather than hold the President in contempt for failing to
defend the constitutionality of Congress's handiwork), the Supreme
Court recognizes that "the means [available to a President] to resist
administration, had spoken of its willingness to defend § 3501 "in an appropriate
case"); see also infra note 97 (noting the critiques by the Bipartisan Legal Advisory
Group of the United States House of Representatives and Cassell regarding the De-
partment of Justice's chosen legal position). Indeed, "[t]o argue otherwise is ulti-
mately to adopt a theory that says that the basis of law-including a declaration of un-
constitutionality-is the court's decision itself." Issues Raised by Foreign Relations
Authorization Bill, 14 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 37, 51 (1990) (quoting Professor
Sanford Levinson).
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
Writing in THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961), Alexander Hamilton observed that "[n]o legislative act... contrary
to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is
greater than his principal; that the serant is above the master; [and] that the repre-
sentatives of the people are superior to the people themselves." Likewise, in an 1868
letter to Gerrit Smith, Chief Justice Salmon Chase asked rhetorically: "How can the
President fulfill his oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution, if he has no
fight to defend it against an act of Congress sincerely believed by him to have been
passed in violation of it?" Issues Raised by Provisions Directing Issuance of Official or
Diplomatic Passports, 16 Op. Off. Legal Counsel. 18, 33 (1992) (quoting ChiefJustice
Chase's letter).
s
7 James Wilson, Statement at the Pennsylvania Convention, 1787, in 2 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 450 (Merrill Jen-
sen ed., 1976). For a detailed analysis of the Framers' intent, see Paulsen, supra note
83, at 228-62.
See Neal Devins & Louis FisherJudicialExclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L.
REV. 83, 88-89 (1998) (recounting some notable examples of presidential review).
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legislative encroachment[s]" includes the power "even to disregard
[laws]" that a President deems "unconstitutional."" Presidential re-
view, finally, is conceded by Congress. Recognizing that it cannot "en-
trust the defense of its vital constitutional powers to the advocate[s]
for the executive branch,"" Congress has enacted legislation requiring
the Attorney General to inform it of cases in which the Justice De-
partment will not defend the constitutionality of a federal statute.9'
In saying that a President need not execute laws that he deems
unconstitutional, I do not mean to suggest that there are no constitu-
tional or prudential limits to the exercise of this power. A president,
for example, cannot refuse to carry out a judicial order, even if he
thinks the order is premised on an incorrect interpretation of the
Constitution. That type of nonacquiescence would place a President
above the Court, render the judicial power a nullity, and ultimately,
cast doubt upon the very foundation of democratic government,
namely: the rule of law.92 Out of respect for both Congress's lawmak-
89 Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia,J. concurring). In addition
to Dickerson, the executive has challenged the constitutionality of, among other things,
the Federal Election Campaign Act, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1976), the legis-
lative veto, INS. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 925 (1983), the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 719 n.1 (1986), the Ethics in Government Act,
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 668 (1988), the Sentencing Reform Act, Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), and diversity preferences in broadcasting, Metro
Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 551 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). In none of the cases did any member of the Court ques-
tion the President's power to challenge the constitutionality of an act of Congress.
90 S. REP. No. 95-170, at 11 (1977).
91 Department ofJustice Appropriation Authorization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
132, § 21(a) (2), 93 Stat. 1049-50 (1979). Pursuant to this provision, Attorney General
Janet Reno, on November 1, 1999, notified the speaker of the House that § 3501 "can-
not constitutionally authorize the admission of statements that would be excluded un-
der the Supreme Court's holding in Miranda v. Arizona." Brief of Amicus Curiae of the
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives at 1,
Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525).
92 In subsequent cases, however, the executive branch "may stick to its (legal) guns,
asserting in tomorrow's case theories that were rejected in yesterday's." Easterbrook,
supra note 83, at 926. This is the view expressed by Abraham Lincoln in the matter of
Dred Scott that is, that the Supreme Court's decision was binding on the parties to the
case but on no one else. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address-Final Text (Mar.
4, 1861), in THE CoLLEcTED WoRKs OF ABRAHAM LINcOLN 262, 268 (Roy P. Basler ed.,
1953); see alsoJohn 0. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General A
Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 375, 389-94
(1993) (describing the "Independent Authority Model" in which the executive branch
bears the burden of interpreting the Constitution "independently in carrying out its
responsibilities"). As applied to Dickerson, a decision upholding § 3501 would not bind
the executive to apply § 3501 in future cases. Rather, the executive could continue to
use Miranda in sorting out whether to introduce a confession into evidence. And even
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ing prerogatives and the judicial power to interpret the Constitution,
moreover, the executive may defend a statute that it thinks unconsti-
tutional." Office of Legal Counsel opinions allow for a President, as a
matter of prudence, to defend constitutionally suspect legislation.
According to these opinions: "The President should presume that
enactments are constitutional" and should "execute the statute, not-
withstanding his own beliefs about the constitutional issue" if he
thinks the Supreme Court would sustain the statute.94 Indeed, even
"[w]here the President's independent constitutional judgment and
his determination of the Court's probable decision converge on a
conclusion of unconstitutionality," the President may nonetheless de-
fend the statute in order "to afford the Supreme Court an opportunity
to review the constitutional judgment of the legislative branch."95 Fi-
nally, as a matter of pure politics, the President may cast aside his con-
stitutional objections and enforce a statute rather than risk funding
cuts, endless oversight hearings, and other forms of congressional op-
probrium. 4
In the Dickerson case, these principles support the Clinton admini-
stration's decision to view Miranda, not § 3501, as the governing legal
standard. By independently interpreting the Constitution, the ad-
ministration concluded that § 3501 was unconstitutional and, conse-
quently, should be treated as a legal nullity. While the courts or Con-
gress might disagree with this assessment, the President's decision was
if the courts were to apply § 3501, not Miranda, the executive would not have to speak
of§ 3501 in court.
I disapprove of this practice. For me, the President's duty to "faithfully execute"
the law should stand as a roadblock to the defense of a statute that the President
deems unconstitutional.
,4 Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op.
Off. Legal Counsel 199, 200 (1994).
9:0 18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel, at 200-01. Along the same lines, Attorney General
Benjamin Civiletti wrote in 1980 that "I do not believe that the prerogative of the Ex-
ecutive is to exercise free and independent judgment on constitutional questions pre-
sented by Acts of Congress. At the same time, I think that in rare cases the Executive's
duty to the constitutional system may require that a statute be challenged...." The
Attorney General's Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legis-
lation, 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55,59 (1980).
" Mike Paulsen puts it this way: "In a bare-knuckled brawl, Congress can reduce
the President to little more than a bureaucrat drawing a fixed salary, vetoing bills,
granting pardons, and receiving foreign ambassadors-but without funds for hosting a
state dinner (or even taking the ambassador to McDonald's)." Paulsen, supra note 83,
at 322. Furthermore, as a condition of broad delegations of lawmaking power, presi-
dents may agree to arguably unconstitutional limitations on their Article II preroga-
tives. See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 273 (Autumn 1993) (citing numerous examples of presidents agreeing to legis-
lative vetoes as a condition on delegated authority).
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a constitutionally protected exercise of his Article II powers. Corre-
spondingly, it is simply beside the point that the President's decision
might run contrary to language in opinions from the Office of Legal
Counsel, calling attention to reasons why a President may want to de-
fend a law that he thinks is unconstitutional. That policy is simply a
prudential guideline; it cannot constrain the President's exercise of
core Article II powers.98
To say that the Justice Department was under no obligation to
raise § 3501, however, does not tell us how a court should respond to
that decision. As an Article III matter, courts were under a duty to
take § 3501, "the statute governing the admissibility of confessions in
federal prosecutions," into account." What, then, is a court to do?
On the one hand, it should have heard arguments both supporting
and opposing the constitutionality of § 3501. By "'sharpen[ing] the
presentation of issues,"' concrete adversariness improves judicial deci-
sion-making by helping to ensure the presentation of a full spectrum
of theories, both factual and legal."* On the other hand, a court
could not compel the President to defend the statute. Nor could it
dismiss the case for want of adversariness. The executive and the
criminal defendant were true adversaries; one side claimed the con-
fession admissible, the other disagreed. Consequently, not only would
dismissing the lawsuit due to lack of adversariness have been wrong
for Article III reasons, it would have undermined the President's Arti-
97 In an amicus brief filed by the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United
States House of Representatives, the Department ofJustice was taken to task for deviat-
ing from Office of Legal Counsel policy. Noting that the appellate court upheld the
statute's constitutionality, the brief argued that there was ample reason to think § 3501
constitutional and, consequently, the Department's refusal to defend was "extraordi-
nary." Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United
States House of Representatives at 3, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000)
(No. 99-5525). Likewise, Court-appointed amicus Paul Cassell criticized the Depart-
ment for failing to defend § 3501. Cassell, supra note 80, at 223-25.
98 Even if the policy were grounded in the President's understanding of the separa-
tion of powers, Article II protects the President's power to rethink his views on consti-
tutional questions. See generally Rabkin & Devins, supra note 84 (discussing constitu-
tional limits on the Court's ability to interfere with or control executive action).
United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 351 (1994); see also supra notes
51-53 and accompanying text (arguing that courts have a duty to look to the law, not
solel the arguments advanced by the parties in a controversy).
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (citation omitted); see also ERWIN
CHEMERINSIy, FEDERALJURISDICtION 40 (1st ed. 1989) ("Because federal courts have
limited ability to conduct independent investigations, they must depend on the parties
to fully present all relevant information to them. It is thought that adverse parties,
with a stake in the outcome of the litigation, will perform this task best.").
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cle II power to independently interpret the Constitution. TO Specifi-
cally, by dismissing the lawsuit, a court would effectively tell the Presi-
dent that all confessions would be kept out of evidence unless and un-
til the President stood ready to defend the applicability of § 3501.
What then is a court to do? It must allow the case to go forward
but it cannot compel either party to defend the statute's constitution-
ality. In the case of the Fourth Circuit (which had no choice but to
resolve the dispute over the confession's admissibility), the options,
ultimately, were either to determine § 3501's constitutionality without
the benefit of arguments defending the statute or, alternatively, to ap-
point counsel to defend the statute. It chose to appoint counsel and
that choice seems reasonable."2
F,1 It is wrong, therefore, to analogize Dickerson to lawmaker challenges to either
presidential claims of executive privilege or to a president's war-making and foreign
policy powers. In most of those cases, the federal courts have made use of any of a
number of the "passive virtues" to avoid rendering a decision on the merits. For ex-
ample, in tossing out Senator Barry Goldwater's claim that President Jimmy Carter
could not unilaterally rescind a treaty with Taiwan, a plurality of the Court concluded
that the matter -as a "dispute between two coequal branches of our Government, each
of which has resources available to protect and assert its interests." Goldwater v. Car-
ter, 444 U.S. 996, 1004 (1979) (Rehnquist,J., concurring). Goldwatersuggests that the
Court will steer clear of Congress-White House disputes unless and until it has to, that
is, unless and until the lawsuit becomes Congress's beef, not the beef of a handful of
Congressmen. But unlike Goldwater (where it could leave the matter in the hands of
the political branches), the Court could not steer clear of Dickerson. The President,
after all, was entitled to argue that the confession should be introduced into evidence.
And once the issue of the confession's admissibility was before it, Article III demands
that the Court decide the case according to the law.
1"2 What is unreasonable, however, is the Fourth Circuit's apparent lack of interest
in hearing arguments challenging the constitutionality of § 3501. True, as the Dicker-
son majority points out, the ClintonJustice Department was unwilling to reveal its views
on this question. At oral argument, counsel for the Justice Department refused to an-
swer questions about § 3501, explaining that "he had been prohibited by his superiors
at the Department ofJustice from discussing § 3501." United States v. Dickerson, 166
F.3d 667, 681 n.14 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Cassell, supra note 80, at 203-23 (highlight-
ing efforts of the Clinton Justice Department to prevent judicial consideration of
§ 3501). At the same time, the appellate court never asked the parties to brief the
§ 3501 issue. According to Dickerson's counsel, James Hundley: "The basis for their
decision was never identified as an issue on appeal. We didn't brief this issue at all."
Carrie Johnson, A Lonely Crusade: Long Running Assault on Miranda Pays Off, LEGAL
TIMEs, Feb. 15, 1999, at 8. In particular, the order granting the Washington Legal
Foundation time to participate in oral arguments came after briefs had been filed in
the case. Moreover, although the parties knew full well that the Washington Legal
Foundation would raise the § 3501 issue, the appellate court's order made no mention
of§ 3501.
Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit, in Independent Insurance Agents, specifi-
call)' requested the parties address-both in oral arguments and supplement briefs-
the continuing validity of the underlying statute. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6
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The Supreme Court had a somewhat different choice. After all,
by denying certiorari, it could have simply sidestepped Dickerson.
However, the Justices had good reason to hear the case." 3 The issue
was important and squarely presented. The Justices, moreover,
thought the Fourth Circuit was wrong in upholding the statute. 4
Consequently, a decision denying certiorari would (at least in the
Fourth Circuit) allow into evidence confessions that ought to have
been suppressed. By hearing the case, moreover, the Justices could
accomplish important institutional objectives. Specifically, by con-
cluding that Congress could not overturn Miranda, the Court could
speak of the binding nature of their constitutional decisions on other
parts of the government.'05 In this way, Dickerson allowed the Justices
to protect their turf and, in so doing, facilitate the Rehnquist Court's
efforts to expand the authority of the Court vis-a-vis Congress. 00
While the Justices may have preferred a truly adversarial controversy
over the constitutionality of § 3501,7 the very real adversariness be-
n.7, United States Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439
(1993) (No. 92-484). In other words, the D.C. Circuit thought it important to ask for
briefing and oral arguments on the question that it raised sua sponte. For this reason,
there is force to the complaint that the Fourth Circuit was one-sided in its considera-
tion of § 3501-upholding the statute "without the benefit of briefing in opposition."
Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 695 (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). In
light of other cases where the Fourth Circuit signaled its interest in resolving the
§ 3501 issue, there is ample reason to believe that a desire to undo Miranda explains
the appellate court's sua sponte raising of § 3501. See Cassell, supra note 80, at 209-16
(describing Fourth Circuit campaign to consider § 3501); see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 3-9 (identifying criticisms of the Fourth Circuit).
103 For a valuable treatment on the steps the Supreme Court takes in deciding
whether to grant certiorari, see H.W. PERRYJR, DECIDING TO DECIDE 216-70 (1991).
104 Even if the Justices did not think about the merits of Dickerson, there were sev-
eral other reasons supporting a grant of certiorari. First, the Justice Department sup-
ported the petition. Second, because the President claimed that the statute was un-
constitutional, there was an apparent conflict between the political branches. Third,
because other circuits did not sua sponte raise § 3501, there was a conflict of sorts be-
tween the Fourth Circuit and other appellate courts.
105 Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2328 ("While Congress has ultimate authority to modify
or set aside any such rules that are not constitutionally required, it may not supersede
this Court's decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution." (citations omit-
ted)).
106 See Greenhouse, supra note 16 (stating that the Court might have overturned
the bitterly fought five to four Miranda decision had it not been for its recent, notably
strong, desire to protect its constitutional turf against incursions by Congress).
At the same time, there was real advantage in deciding the constitutionality of
§ 3501 in a nonadversarial setting. With the Justice Department, as well as the Demo-
cratic leadership of the House, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional, the
Court's decision does not appear especially countermajoritarian. See Mark A. Graber,
The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEv.
35 (1993) (calling attention to ways in which the political branches encourage the
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tween the Clinton Justice Department and the criminal defendant
over the admissibility of the confession was more than enough to sup-
port a grant of certiorari in Dickerson.'8
In saying that the Court did the right thing in Dickerson, I do not
mean to suggest that courts ought to search out ways to decide cases
in which the executive is unwilling to defend the constitutionality of
an act of Congress.' ° Dickerson is a truly unusual case, involving the
confluence of Congress's Article I power to enact rules of procedure
in criminal cases, the courts' Article III duty to take those rules into
account, a President's Article II power to repudiate those rules, and
the presence of a truly adversarial dispute. In other words, the ap-
pointment of an amicus in Dickerson is totally consistent with-even
mandated by-the "dispute resolution" model of litigation.
Contrast these facts to INS v. Chadha."° In Chadha, the Depart-
ment of Justice refused to defend the constitutionality of the legisla-
tive veto, preferring, instead, to argue that the veto undermined the
President's power to execute the law."' Specifically, the Department
thought that a decision by the Attorney General to suspend a deporta-
tion was unreviewable by Congress (absent the enactment of legisla-
tion which satisfied the Constitution's demands of bicameralism and
presentment). Rather than treat the legislative veto as a nullity (by re-
fusing to deport Chadha), however, the Department argued that it was
willing to enforce a court ruling upholding the veto. For this reason,
the Department argued that the court should settle this "dispute"
notwithstanding the case's apparent lack of adversariness. Agreeing
with this rationale, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals assured an "ad-
versary presentation of the issues" by allowing the House of Represen-
tatives and Senate to intervene in Chadha (but only after hearing oral
Court to strike laws down).
Jog Furthermore, considering the number of years it took for a lower court to sua
sponte raise § 3501 (and with little reason to think-after thirty years of not invoking
§ 3501-that the justice Department would make use of the statute), there was reason
to doubt the prospect of a truly adversarial controversy over the applicability of§ 3501.
1,, Courts can accomplish this feat either by appointing amici to defend the statute
(as they did in Dickerson) or by broadening the rules of intervention to parties who
otherwise do not have standing.
" 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
See Brief for the Immigration and Naturalization Service at 15-64, INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (Nos. 80-1832, 80-2170, & 80-2171) (arguing that a legis-
lative veto would allow Congress to pass general legislation authorizing one or both of
its houses to veto any decision or order of the President or other officer of the United
States); see also BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG, CHADHA: THE STORY OF AN EPIC
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE 148-87 (1990 ed.) (discussing Department ofJustice deci-
sionmaking in Chadha litigation).
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112arguments in the case!). The Supreme Court went along with the
Justice Department's campaign for a definitive judicial resolution of
the legislative veto's constitutionality."3 But, it should not have. Un-
like Dickerson, a decision dismissing the case would not have interfered
with the President's Article II powers to both interpret the Constitu-
tion and "faithfully execute the laws." The only thing preventing the
Attorney General from suspending Chadha's deportation was his
hope that the Supreme Court would rule on the constitutionality of
the legislative veto. Correspondingly, as an Article III matter, the
Chadha litigation was an abomination. 4 The desire for a court deci-
sion, in and of itself, does not support judicial resolution of a case in
which there is no disagreement.
The lesson here is simple. A President's power to interpret the
Constitution is not the power to demandjudicial rulings on these in-
terpretations."5 Sometimes a President and Congress need to do bat-
1 SeeJurisdictional Statement at 13 n.9, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (No.
80-1832) (explaining why Chadha satisfies the case or controversy requirement). Ironi-
cally, in filing a motion to intervene in Chadha, the House and Senate sought a rehear-
ing en banc with the express purpose of "argu[ing] that the Ninth Panel that had
heard the case had erred in granting jurisdiction because there had been no adverse-
ness." CRAIG, supra note 111, at 166; see Brief of the United States House of Represen-
tatives at 41-50, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (Nos. 80-1832, 80-2170, & 80-2171)
(arguing that the Court was without jurisdiction to decide Chadha).113 The Justice Department saw Chadha as the perfect vehicle to challenge the legis-
lative veto. By finding that Chadha did not meet the statutory requirements of "hard-
ship," the legislative veto became a clear intrusion into the executive's power to im-
plement the law. See CRAIG, supra note 111, at 167 (proposing that in Chadha the
Justice Department was seeking the Court's "stamp of approval"). For this reason,
Chadha, not Dickerson, may be the emblematic case of conservatives willing to suspend
their campaign againstjudicial activism in order to advance their ideological agenda in
court.
114 My complaint here is that the courts created a case or controversy by allowing
de facto legislative standing without the usual requisites. Indeed, there was good rea-
son to think that Chadha was moot. By marrying an American citizen, Chadha was enti-
tled to stay in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1430(b) (1994) ("Any person.., whose
spouse is... a citizen of the United States... may be naturalized upon compliance
with all the requirements of the naturalization laws.... ."). Of course, it may be that
the Justices reached out to decide Chadha because they were eager to strike down the
legislative veto. But this desire to expound on the Constitution's meaning should give
way to the jurisdictional demands of Article III. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v.
United States ex reL Stevens, 120 S. Ct. 1858, 1862 (2000); see also infra note 116 (argu-
ing that the Court wrongfully appointed amicus in the Bob Jones case in order to fur-
ther certain political goals).
115 See Michael Stokes Paulson, Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency After
Twenty-Five Years, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1363-66 (1999) (highlighting the absurdity of
Nixon, who on the one hand claimed absolute immunity from compulsory judicial
process, while on the other hand came to the courts, hat in hand, asking for the courts
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tie with each other over the Constitution's meaning.16 In Chadha, the
President's squabble was with Congress. While seeking cover behind a
court ruling may have made political sense to the President, n7 he
should have taken his complaint to the Congress."" Sometimes, how-
ever, courts should intercede in what appears to be a dispute between
the political branches. In Dickerson, the presence of a clearly adversar-
ial dispute necessitated the appointment of an amicus to defend
§ 3501. Otherwise, the President's Article II power to independently
interpret the Constitution would have been jeopardized. In the end,
fidelity to the separation of powers-not a desire to enhance the judi-
ciary's power to expound on public values-may well explain the
Court's action in Dickerson."9
IV. THE RULE OF LAW AND DICKiSON
In the preceding pages, I have argued that the judiciary's Article
III responsibility to "say what the law is" and the President's Article II
to sa that this is so).
For this very reason, the Court was wrong to appoint amicus to argue the "gov-
ernment's side" in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599 n.24 (1983). In
Bob Jones, both parties agreed that the University was entitled to tax-exempt status, not-
withstanding its religiously based policies against interracial dating and marriage by
students. See generally Thomas McCoy & Neal Devins, Standing and Adverseness in Chal-
lenges of Tax Exemptionsfor Discriminatory Pivate Schools, 52 FoRDHAM L. REv. 441,462-64
(1984) (describing the Court's actions in Bob Jones as an attempt to legislate on a po-
litically controversial issue when there was no longer a need for judicial resolution).
Nevertheless, the political cost of granting a tax break to Bob Jones University was too
much for the Reagan administration. Consequently, after announcing its plan to re-
store Bob Jones University's tax-exempt status (and petitioning the Supreme Court to
moot the school's challenge to the government's earlier denial of tax-exempt status),
the administration once again reversed course-this time asking theJustices to appoint
counsel to defend the government's earlier practice of denying tax breaks to racist
schools. Id. Rather than grant this request, the Court should have forced the admini-
stration to bear the costs of a politically unpopular decision.
117 As a matter of pure politics, presidents have always found that the benefits of
agreeing to the legislative veto--expansive delegations of power-have always out-
weighed the costs-conditions on the exercise of delegated power. See generally Fisher,
supra note 96, at 277-84 (noting several presidents who have agreed to legislative vetoes
as a condition on delegated authority). For this reason, the White House had much to
gain in seeking the judicial invalidation of the legislative veto.
I This, after all, is the logic of Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) ("The
Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between the
President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse."),
and other cases denying lawmakers standing to challenge executive branch decision-
making. With respect to the legislative veto, the President could take his complaint to
Congress simply by refusing to enforce or to sign bills with legislative veto provisions.
u It is also possible that the Court sought to resolve the dispute and expound on
public constitutional values.
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power to independently interpret the Constitution support both the
sua sponte raising of the 1968 statute and the appointment of counsel
to defend the constitutionality of the statute.2 " But, much more than
the separation of powers is at stake in Dickerson. A decision forbidding
the courts' consideration of legal theories not raised by the litigants
would cast doubt on the rule of law.
Let me explain. The rule of law is anchored in the belief that law
is binding (especially on the sovereign) and, consequently, that the
administration of law must conform with the declared rule. 12 1 By
authoritatively settling what is to be done, the rule of law fosters "the
virtues of reliance, predictability, and stability[, and] by reducing vari-
ance in individual cases," the rule of law allows both individuals and
government officials to plan their lives.12' Needless to say, the law is
subject to interpretation. Furthermore, executive officials, especially
prosecutors, possess significant discretion in administering the law. At
the same time, the rule of law presupposes that an independent judi-
ciary will base its decisionmaking on the law, not the policy priorities
of the executive branch.
123
Imagine the alternative, that is, a regime in which the parties to a
dispute define the "law." Courts, lacking the power to independently
look to the governing law, would rule under the terms and conditions
of the parties who pursue litigation. Most of the time, one or the
other party will have real incentives to call attention to the governing
law. That, of course, is the premise of the adversarial system, namely,
that the parties to a dispute will seek to advance their cause by advanc-
ing all pertinent legal arguments that support their position. Some of
120 By taking the 1968 law into account, the courts also gave meaning to Congress's
Article I power to legislate rules of evidence. See supra note 67 (contrasting Congress's
lawmaking power with the judiciary's power to "say what the law is").
121 See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITYOF LAW 33-41, 81-91 (1964) (discuss-
ing the importance of congruity between the rules as announced and their actual ad-
ministration). "Rule must be by law and not discretion" so that "the lawmaker itself
must be under the law." Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan, Democracy and the
Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 97, 101 (Allan C. Hutchinson &
Patrick Monahan eds., 1987); see also Ian Shapiro, Introduction, in THE RULE OF LAW 1,
5, 10 n.4 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994) (discussing how judges decide cases based on black
letter law as well as other legal standards).
122 Macedo, supra note 40, at 154; see also Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1371-81 (1997) (dis-
cussing the settlement function of law).123
See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing the influence of the execu-
tive branch upon the judiciary in light of the separation of powers doctrine). Of
course, to faithfully execute the law, the executive must interpret the law and, in so
doing, may look for ways to integrate its policy priorities into the law.
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the time, however, neither party will have incentive to call the govern-
ing law to the court's attention. This was true of Dickerson, Erie, and, to
a certain extent, Marbury.124 On other occasions, moreover, a party
quite willing to raise an issue will not. This may be a result of bad law-
yering or the simple failure to realize that the court is interested in,
say, reconsidering a longstanding interpretation of the Constitution
or some federal statute. This was true in Independent Insurance Agents
as well as a host of cases where courts have looked to amicus briefs
and other sources to glean the appropriate legal standard to apply.
The costs of leaving it to opposing counsel to call the governing
law to the court's attention cannot be overestimated. In such a re-
gime, precedent would give way to party arguments-so that the law
would no longer act as a stabilizing force. 26 Furthermore, an inde-
pendent judiciary would no longer see to it that the sovereign oper-
ated within the rule of law; instead, it would be up to opposing coun-
sel to call the governing law to the court's attention. Take the
Dickerson case. For more than thirty years, the Justice Department
steered clear of the 1968 statute. As such, there was little reason to
think that the Department would employ (what all, including the Su-
preme Court, recognized to be) "the statute governing the admissibil-
ity of confessions in federal prosecutions."1 2 ' Far more significant, had
some prosecutor pursued the 1968 statute and prevailed, the Justice
124 See supra text accompanying notes 2-4 (discussing instances in Dickerson where
both sides ignored the 1968 statute); supra text accompanying notes 54-55 (discussing
Eriewhere both sides deliberately neglected to call for the overruling of Swift). In Mar-
bury, Madison chose to thumb his nose at the Federalist Supreme Court by ignoring
the lawsuit. See DONALD DE%,E MARSHALL V. JEFFERSON: THE POLITICAL
BACKGROUND OF MARBURY V. MADISON 96-99 (1970). Consequently, the issue of the
Court's jurisdiction to issue Marbury a writ of mandamus was not challenged by either
party to the litigation. For further discussion, see supra notes 32, 49, 50 and accompa-
nyin text.
A Indep. Ins. Agents v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds,
508 U.S. 439 (1993) (listing Teague v. Lane and Mapp v. Ohio, as examples of cases
where the Supreme Court looked to amicus briefs); see also supra text accompanying
notes 75-78 (listing Independent Insurance Agents and the possible negative effects of
making a ruling based on something other than the law).
126 Imagine the following hypothetical: The Supreme Court overrules Miranda in a
1995 decision. The Clinton Justice Department, however, thinks that decision incor-
rect and, consequently, continues to utilize Miranda. Should a lower federal court
judge (undoubtedly aware of the 1995 decision) pretend the new rule doesn't exist
because neither party raises it? If the answer to this question is no-lower court judges
must adhere to Supreme Court precedent-is there any principled reason to distin-
guish the above facts from the situation in Dickerson, namely, the efforts of litigants to
treat duly enacted, presumably constitutional, nonwaivable legislation as a nullity?
127 United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 351 (1994).
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Department would be under no obligation to treat that decision as
binding precedent. Rather, assuming that the criminal defendant
agreed, the Department (simply by refusing to mention the statute)
could demand that the courts adhere to Miranda in subsequent cases.
Indeed, the Justice Department and criminal defendants could stipu-
late that the governing standard is something altogether different
than either Miranda or the 1968 statute. In other words, the rule of
law would be replaced by the rule of men. 8
My point here is not that the rule of law presupposes that courts
see themselves as an expositor of norms, nor as resolvers of individual
disputes.'9 It is, instead, that courts should not knowingly apply the
wrong legal standard. When an issue is squarely before the court (as
was the admissibility of Dickerson's confession), courts must look to
the law, not just the arguments of the parties before it.'3 In other
words, notwithstanding our commitment to the adversarial system,
there must be enough play in the joints that [a federal court] need not
render judgment on the basis of a rule of law whose nonexistence is ap-
parent on the face of things, simply because the parties agree upon it-
128 In Dickerson, the rule of men (adherence to Miranda irrespective of the constitu-
tionality of the 1968 statute) was more protective of the criminal defendant than the
rule of law (adherence to the 1968 statute unless that statute was found unconstitu-
tional). In another case, however, the rule of men might be less rights-protective than
the rule of law. For example, proposed legislation would require federal courts to or-
der DNA testing from the crime scene, at government expense if the accused cannot
pay for it. James Q. Wilson, WhatDeath-Penalty Errors?, N.Y. TIMEs,July 10, 2000, at A19.
Under the rule of law, a federal court would be obligated to order such testing irre-
spective of whether counsel for the accused made a request for such testing.
1I therefore disagree with scholarly efforts to link the rule of law to the "public
values" model of litigation. See, e.g., Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit
Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99
YALE L.J. 801, 803-04 (1990) (asserting that the judicial branch's ability to establish a
rule of law enables the branch to serve as an expositor of norms). Consider, for exam-
ple, the rule of law demand that a court must first satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction
before it addresses the merits of a dispute. For a proponent of the "dispute resolution"
model, the rule of law is honored by treating jurisdiction as a very real constraint on a
court's power to "say what the law is." In contrast, proponents of the "public values"
model would treat jurisdiction as a de minimis constraint on the judiciary's power to
speak to the merits.
130 This is especially true when Congress has enacted legislation prohibiting parties
from waiving a legal theory in support of their claim. By mandating judicial considera-
tion of that legal theory, Congress-consistent with its supervisory powers over the fed-
eral courts-has defined which legal issues should be before the court. Of course, as
was true in Dickerson, a court can claim that Congress acted unconstitutionally. But it
cannot claim that principles ofjudicial economy prevent it from sua sponte consider-
ing matters that neither party raised in their filings. See supra notes 32, 51, 129 and ac-
companying text (arguing that the judiciary's raising of sua sponte issues conforms to
the "dispute resolution" model of litigation).
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particularly when the judgment will reinforce error already prevalent in
the system."
Judges, then, should look to party filings, their own knowledge of
the law, the research of their law clerks, amicus filings, and the like, to
inform themselves. And when statutory language mandates judicial
consideration of an issue or when the court is convinced that the par-
ties before it are seeking a decision on something other than the law,
judges must be willing to frustrate party expectations by grounding
their decision in "the law," not in party arguments."2 By "saying what
the law is," judges will honor both their Article III independence and
the rule of law. 133 In so doing, the courts will be able to perform their
most important task-legitimating the actions of elected government
111 United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring). For
this reason, I think that D.C. Circuit judge Laurence Silberman goes too far in calling
for court decisionmaking to (almost always) be limited to party arguments. See Indep.
Ins. Agents of America, Inc. v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 731, 741-44 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Silber-
man, dissenting) (arguing that courts are not self-directed boards of legal inquiry),
revd on other grounds, 508 U.S. 439 (1993); United States v. Pryce, 938 F.2d 1343, 1353
(1991) (Silberman,J., dissenting in part) ("We thus ordinarily have no right to con-
sider issues not raised by a party in either briefing or argument, both because our sys-
tem assumes and depends upon the assistance of counsel, and because of the unfair-
ness of such a practice to the other party." (citations omitted)).
132 For this reason, the decision to sua sponte raise § 3501 in Dickerson was proper,
not simply permissible. At the same time, to ensure thatjudges operate within the rule
of law, it is imperative that judges limit those occasions on which they sua sponte raise
legal arguments. The types of cases where courts should sua sponte raise arguments
not considered by the parties are jurisdictional issues, matters on which Congress has
mandated that parties cannot waive a particular legal claim, and issues of statutory
construction where there is reason to doubt the continuing validity of the underlying
statute. Beyond these categories, courts should only raise a legal theory to prevent
themselves from knowingly grounding their decisions in the wrong legal standard.
Even within these categories, judges should exercise some restraint. For example,
judges should be especially cautious about sua sponte raising issues that they consider
close questions. In part, a truly adversarial presentation will facilitate their resolution
of such disputes. Furthermore, the more willing judges are to raise such issues, the
greater the risk that judges will see their power to decide cases as part and parcel of an
unbounded commission to expound on the meaning of federal law. See Kamen v.
Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc. 500 U.S. 90, 97 n.4, 99 (1991) (leaving "for another day" one
antecedent legal issue not raised by the parties while resolving another antecedent le-
gal issue as part of its "power to identify and apply the proper construction of govern-
ing law"). By limiting themselves this wayjudges will be constrained by the rule of law.
In contrast, an open-ended rule which allows judges to raise whatever legal arguments
they find of interest would risk transforming the rule of law into a judge-dominated
rule of man.
B3 I do not mean to suggest here that federal court judges have a duty to search
out all relevant law on each and every legal issue that they confront. Limitations in
judicial resources would make such an undertaking impossible. But, when confronted
with relevant lawjudges cannot avert their eyes and look only to party arguments.
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"What a government of limited powers needs, at the beginning and
forever, is some means of satisfying the people that it has taken all
steps humanly possible to stay within its powers." 4
In Dickerson, the Justice Department claim that Miranda, not the
1968 statute, is the standard governing the admissibility of confessions
has now been validated by the Supreme Court. In other words, by sua
sponte raising the 1968 statute and by appointing counsel to defend
the statute, the judiciary has legitimated this Justice Department posi-
tion. In contrast, a decision steering clear of the 1968 statute, because
neither party invoked it, would have cast doubt on this Justice De-
partment position. More fundamentally, such a decision would sug-
gest that the President-at least sometimes-is not bound by the law.
Of course, the Supreme Court could have upheld the 1968 stat-
ute. Had this occurred, the President might well have resisted the
Court (and Congress) by continuing to utilize the Miranda standard.
Even here, however, the Constitution would be made more vibrant
and stable. The logic of our system of checks and balances, as Alex-
ander Bickel wrote, is that "the effectiveness of the whole depends on
[each branch's] involvement with one another.., even if it often is
the sweaty intimacy of creatures locked in combat." 5  More to the
point, by exercising his power of presidential review, the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination would play out
in a dialogue between the branches and the people. For example, by
continuing to argue that Miranda is the appropriate benchmark, the
executive could press its case to the courts-to reconsider their rul-
ing-to the Congress-to repeal the 1968 statute-and to the peo-
ple-to use the ballot box and other mechanisms to support Miranda.
CONCLUSION
The separation of powers and the rule of law both support the sua
sponte raising of the 1968 statute and appointment of counsel to de-
fend the statute. While a desire to undo Miranda may have been the
motivation for all this,"' it is nevertheless true that a court committed
to judicial restraint would have followed a similar course. Just as a
president must independently interpret the Constitution, courts must
14u CARLEs L. BLACK,JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 52 (1960).
135 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 261 (1962).
13 See supra notes 10-16, 102 and accompanying text (discussing the Fourth Cir-
cuit's motivation to sua sponte consider the 1968 statute).
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exercise their power to "say what the law is.". 7 Otherwise, our tripar-
tite system of government and, with it, our commitment to the rule of
law will collapse.
137 Article I values are also implicated; in particular, Congress's supervisory power
over the rules of evidence. See supra note 120 (discussing Congress's lawmaking
power).
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